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CONTRACT FORMALISM, SCIENTISM, AND THE
M-WORD: A COMMENT ON PROFESSOR
MOVSESIAN'S UNDER-THEORIZATION THESIS
Jeffrey M Lipshaw*
Professor Mark Movsesian has proposed an interesting thesis on the
similarities and differences between classical and contemporary contract
formalism.' He compares the work of Samuel Williston, exemplifying
the classical formalism of the early twentieth century, with
contemporary contract formalism, which arises primarily out of an
academic consensus that contract law should be directed to economic
efficiency, and formalism, which at least in most circumstances,
promotes efficiency and welfare maximization. The most significant
difference is what Professor Movsesian describes as the undertheorization of classical formalism. Perhaps to oversimplify, classical
formalism was concerned with the pragmatic resolution of doctrinal
disputes, and the development of a coherent body of contract law as a
self-contained body, proceeding, by and large, by means of deductive or
inductive logic, from case to case to case. Contemporary formalism, by
comparison, is theorized because legal scholars now attempt through
cross-disciplinary study to explain why formalism, normatively, is
preferable to the alternatives.
Professor Movsesian's essay strikes tantalizingly close to the
broader problem: Just what is it that contemporary law professors are
doing when they theorize? We see this in the discussion of the changing
relationship between the law faculty and the rest of the university
* Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School; Visiting Associate Professor, Tulane
University Law School. I am grateful for the kind encouragement and helpful comments from Mark
Movsesian, Chris Cotropia, Frank Snyder and Nathan Oman. More importantly, I am grateful for
Professor Movsesian's scholarship on Williston, particularly the long view of the way legal scholars
fit into their times.
1. See Mark L. Movsesian, Formalism in American Contract Law: Classical and
Contemporary, 12 lus GENTIUM 115 (2006) [hereinafter Movsesian, Formalism]. For an even more
thorough analysis of Williston's jurisprudence, see Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207 (2005) [hereinafter Movsesian, Williston].
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community: Williston and his contemporaries thought of themselves
more as lawyers than as members of the broader university; in
contemporary legal academia, the rhetoric, if not the reality, is now
clearly reversed.2 I want to suggest, however, an area in which there is a
consistency to the under-theorization between the classical and the
modem contract formalists, and that is the extent to which theorization
in anything that approaches metaphysics is, and has been, consistently
anathema.
In the same way that academic philosophy has, over the last
hundred years, retreated from an emphasis on morality to an emphasis
on analytics 3-and, I suspect, has also lost most of the audience outside
the academy for serious but accessible philosophy-so too legal
theorizing-at least in my area, that concerning business-has turned
away from philosophical inquiry into the intuitions on which
practitioners rely, looking instead to social science analytics as the
primary tool of research.4 If we accept social science methodologies as
the means of theorizing, Professor Movsesian is undoubtedly correct.
Compared to the output of contemporary scholars, the classicists were
wildly under-theorized. But there is a consistency as well: Williston
helped institutionalize the revulsion for metaphysics in the law, and
contemporary 5 formalists have no apparent interest in reviving the Mword subject.
I agree with Professor Movsesian: Much of what contemporary
formalists have developed in the study of private law is rich. We do
ourselves and our students a disservice, however, when we fail to
question the normative assumptions that necessarily must underlie the
theorizing. Hence, the only philosophical grounding of formalism has
come-implicitly or explicitly-from the pragmatists, a school of
thought that only developed about the same time that Williston was
writing on contract law. Economics and pragmatism both take practical
and instrumental reasoning towards ends as the primary focus; neitherfor different reasons-wants to spend time contemplating whence comes
the end.
It is hardly surprising that Williston's formalism and contemporary
formalism each reflect a predominant philosophical world view of their
2. See Movsesian, Formalism,supra note 1, at 141-42.
3. See Catharine Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism Works for Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 347, 35051 (2000).
4. So, for example, intuition might be studied as "heuristics" under behavioral economics.
5. Credit to Nathan Oman for the use of the term "M-word" for metaphysics in a talk to the
Wake Forest faculty in the fall of 2005.
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times. 6 Williston sought to make contract law coherent by identifying
through induction the correct principles that informed judicial opinions. 7
The great pragmatist John Dewey wrote: "The striving to make stability
of meaning prevail over the instability of events is the main task of
intelligent human effort."8 Williston described law as a pragmatic
science and "one that must be judged by its real world application"; 9
Dewey as well saw the resolution of contingencies not in philosophical
speculation, but in the work of science:
Philosophies have too often tried to forego the actual work that is
involved in penetrating the true nature of experience, by setting up a
purely theoretical security and certainty. The influence of this attempt
upon the traditional philosophic preference for unity, permanence,
universals, over plurality, change and particulars is pointed out, as well
as its effect in creating the traditional
notion of substance, now
10
undermined by physical science.
Indeed, Williston expressly cautioned against the mixing of law and
metaphysics."
As Professor Movsesian correctly observes, the predominant world
view of the legal academy today is centered in the social sciences, and
particularly economics. 12 Moreover, the preeminent spokesman for law
and economics has been Richard Posner; behavioral and institutional
economics as applied to the law are largely reactions to perceived
limitations of Posner's rational choice model.1 3 Posner's world view is
not just economic, it is scientific, and based in a kind of post-modem
"pragmatic skepticism" that is frankly derisive of metaphysical
contemplation.1 4 Moreover, the alignment of science and pragmatism is

6. Williston taught at Harvard from about 1890 to about 1950. See Movsesian, Formalism,
supra note 1, at 127.
7. Seeid. at 133-31.
8. JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 50 (Dover Publ'ns 1958).
9. Movsesian, Formalism, supra note 1,at 128 (citation omitted).
10.

DEWEY, supra note 8, at xi.

11. See Movsesian, Williston, supra note 1,at 213 n.36.
12. Movsesian, Formalism, supra note 1, at 126. For a general discussion of the turn to social
scientism, see Bongo Adi et al., Rational Choice, Scientific Method and Social Scientism (Sept. 7,
2005), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cftn?abstract-id=799584.
13. See, e.g., Christine Jolls
et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.

L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998) (advancing "an approach to the economic analysis of law that is
informed by a more accurate conception of choice, one that reflects a better understanding of human
behavior").
14. I have previously discussed pragmatism generally, as well as Judge Posner's brand of
pragmatism, and his disdain for metaphysical speculation, at length. See Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
Contingency and Contracts: A Philosophy of Complex Business Transactions, 54 DEPAUL L. REV.
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no coincidence: "[P]ragmatists are thoroughgoing empiricists and
therefore find traditional epistemological questions nonsensical."', 5
Pragmatism is defined by its lack of adherence to any particular
dogma; its normative principle is that one should do whatever works to
accomplish the end one wants to accomplish. Compared to the
subjective musings of philosophy, the inquiries of science that reach
objectively into nature are better, "because reached by method which
controls them and which adds greater control to life itself, method which
mitigates accident, turns contingency to account, and releases thought
and other forms of endeavor."' 6 The goal is commendable, particularly
in today's world: Better to avoid the dangers of philosophic
and
contemplation of truth-with its inherent tendency to find absolutes
7
extremes-and simply act in this world to make things better.'
Still, even if one is not an absolutist or extremist, one might still be
interested in contemplating the possibility of universals. Pragmatism
hails its own lack of interest in the determination, much less discussion,
of that subject. Indeed, it is a world view that has a hard time making
clear just what it stands for, and an even harder time generating passion
around it.' 8 Legal pragmatists, like their philosophical antecedents,
believe knowledge is "contextual"--embodied in language, experience,
culture and practice-and "instrumental"-it is meaningful only as a
tool to solve real problems. 19 As a general statement, pragmatists employ
a methodology toward resolution of legal issues that rejects the
grounding of law in any single overriding value, doctrine, policy, or set
of principles.2 0 They look to "practical reason," but not the practical
reason that Kant holds may access a priori moral imperatives. It is
instead "intersubjective understanding through 'dialogue, conversation,
undistorted communication, communal judgment, and the type of
rational wooing that can take place when individuals confront each other
1077, 1109-13, 1120-25 (2005). I think Judge Posner's point is that the ultimate questions with

which metaphysics concerns itself can never be resolved, and hence it is a useless and wasteful
endeavor.

15. Wells, supra note 3, at 356. To her credit, Wells offers a sympathetic, if to me
unsatisfying, defense of pragmatism.
16.
17.

DEWEY, supra note 8, at 70.
See id. at 52-77.

18. To take a historical example, we are stirred by the passion of a Patrick Henry on liberty or
a Nathan Hale on love of country, but one great American is known because he was the
embodiment of pragmatism. Yet, can anyone remember anything that Senator Henry Clay of
Kentucky, the Great Compromisor, actually said?
19. See Thomas F. Cotter, Legal Pragmatism and the Law and Economics Movement, 84
GEO. L.J. 2071, 2075-79 (1996).
20. See id. at 2082-85.
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as equals and participants." '' 2' And legal pragmatists reject sharp
distinctions between ends and means:
[G]oals themselves are never final; "they are at best momentary resting
points whose attainment has further foreseeable consequences
desirable or undesirable; hence they must themselves be evaluated as
means relative to those consequences." Similarly, the means we select
to accomplish our ends are not exclusively instrumental; "activities,
however instrumentally conceived, are to be evaluated by their
or frustrations as well as by their
intrinsic satisfactions
' 22
consequences.

"

Our students will face ex ante questions of not just legal but moral
choice, and what concerns me is whether we have armed them-either
as lawyers or human beings-with any theoretical basis for grappling
with those questions other than the tools of doctrine and the descriptive
observations of social science. The problem is our long-standing
discomfort with metaphysics, and the resulting default to an implicit
philosophy of scientism-perhaps it is simply not our job to provoke our
students on issues of moral ends, and theorizing on that subject is not
our department. It is certainly the case that we are unlikely to find
determinate answers. Indeed, the Kantian scholar Christine Korsgaard
has captured the sense of futility and indeterminacy that leads us away
from metaphysical contemplation and toward science (either physical or
social): "It is the worry that nothing will count as reflective success, and
so that the work of reflection will never be done. 2 3 So the study of
intuition, judgment and choice becomes not the philosophical inquiry
into free will and determinism, 24 but 25the current flurry around the
relationship of brain science and the law.
21. Id. at 2087 (quoting RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM:
SCIENCE, HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS 223 (1983)).
22. Id. at 2093 (quoting Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. REV.
787, 854-55 (1989)).
23. CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, THE SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY 94 (1996).
24. See Donald Davidson, Mental Events, in ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 252, 252-62 (A.P.
Martinich & David Sosa eds., 2001); see also Donald Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, in
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY, supra, at 332, 332-41.
25. On the scientific side of the ledger, see DANIEL C. DENNETT, BREAKING THE SPELL:
RELIGION AS A NATURAL PHENOMENON (2006); LAURENCE R. TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR:
WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY (2005); DANIEL M. WEGNER, THE ILLUSION OF
CONSCIOUS WILL (2002); Daniel M. Wegner, Precis of The Illusion of Conscious Will, 27 BEHAV.

& BRAIN SCI. 649 (2004); Peter Westen, Getting the Fly Out of the Bottle: The False Problem of
Free Will and Determinism, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 599 (2005); Owen D. Jones, On the Nature of
Norms: Biology, Morality, and the Disruption of Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2072, 2102-03 (2000)
(reviewing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE AND THE
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What does this have to do with contract formalism? Only that we
are fooling ourselves if we think scientific theories of the law, whether
grounded in classical doctrine or contemporary social science, are ever
going to be instructive to lawyers making a decision about what to do
when faced with moral or legal choice.' As Professor Korsgaard
responded to the scientific determinists in The Sources of Normativity, it
is not to deny the possibility one might have predicted that I was bound
to choose the way I did, but to suggest that knowing that my decisions
are predictable will not affect the way I choose.
The Scientific World View is a description of the world which serves
the purposes of explanation and prediction. When its concepts are
applied correctly it tells us things that are true. But it is not a substitute
for human life. And nothing in human life is more real than the fact we
must make our decisions and choices "under the idea of freedom."
When desire bids, we 26can indeed take it or leave it. And that is the
source of the problem.
I can speak from years of experience in the law firm and corporate
world: Lawyers and business clients are no more interested, on the
whole, in philosophical theories of human behavior than they are in
scientific theories. Practicing lawyers do not think about philosophy in
their work any more than they consider microeconomics, game theory,
chaos theory or other scholarly attempts to make sense of, and predict,
what they do and why. It is a pragmatic world out there, particularly
with respect to ideas: They are meaningful to the extent that they are
useful. And, by and large, deep theory, whether metaphysical or
economic, is not useful, any more than understanding the computer
science theory underlying Microsoft Word has any use to me as I am
typing right now.
But I do see a connection between moral philosophy and the real
world. Contract law in its broadest sense has to do not just with
economic efficiency, but with solving problems, with getting along, with
facing uncertainty, and is merely one way human beings go about
RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999)).

On the other side, see Brian Leiter & Michael

Weisberg, Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So Far)Irrelevantto Law (Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law Pub.
Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 89, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-892881;
John Mikhail, Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition: InvestigatingIntuitive Knowledge of the
Prohibitionof Intentional Battery and the Principle of Double Effect (Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 762385, 2002), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-762385; Leon Wieseltier, The God Genome, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Feb.
19, 2006, at 11 (reviewing DENNETT, supra).
26. KORSGAARD, supra note 23, at 97 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 6:378 (Mary J. Gregor ed., 1991) (1785)).
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dealing with each of those issues. Going beyond the descriptive, or
challenging the implicit normative in what passes as explanatory, can
take us uncomfortably close to M-word issues, like the issues of freedom
and autonomy Williston put aside and to which we as an academic
discipline have largely not returned. The richness comes about because
we do not all have to or want to speak from the same world view, but
there are world views, particularly around ethical issues in the face of
what passes as rational self-interest, that are as under-theorized as ever.
I am not comfortable with a world in which the only theorization
around contract language is that which looks to economic efficiency-or
even reconciles efficiency with fairness. I am even less comfortable with
one in which law students who will enter the business world simply
accept ends-whether or not reflected in the contract language-or are
pragmatically skeptical as to any expression of ends, or see their place in
the world as nothing more than sources of instrumental reason by which
one argues for a particular interpretation of the formal contract language.
The academy is not alone in its move to the cross-disciplinary; modem
business recognizes as well that boundaries and barriers between
disciplines, like law and engineering and accounting and manufacturing,
impede speed and productivity. A business lawyer advising a technology
start-up, or acting as a member of the executive team of a large
corporation, can no longer-at least if she is to be effective-maintain
what in Williston's era was, no doubt, a professional distance from the
client.27 Hence, it is not surprising that Williston believed classroom
discussion of political economy, sociology, and philosophy would
28 Yes,
detract from subjects of "more direct professional importance.
contract law is more theorized now than in Williston's day, but it is
overwhelmingly theorizing of a particular form: dispassionate social
science inquiry into how we tick, rarely questioned but implicit norms
shaped solely around the utilitarian, if not material, consequence of
choices, all seasoned by the occasional post-modem expression of
futility and desperation around the indeterminacy of moral issues. It does
not address the way we might think about solving the problem outside of

27. See generally NOEL M. TICHY, CONTROL YOUR DESTINY OR SOMEBODY ELSE WILL:
HOW JACK WELCH IS MAKING GENERAL ELECTRIC THE WORLD'S MOST COMPETITIVE
CORPORATION (1993) (discussing among other things Jack Welch's concept of "boundarylessness"

in business).
28. Movsesian, Williston, supra note 1, at 228 n.148 (quoting Samuel Williston, Book
Review, 43 HARV. L. REV. 972, 974 (1930) (reviewing J.H. LANDMAN, THE CASE METHOD OF
STUDYING LAW (1930))).
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the formal models-whether classically or economically based--of the
law.29
One of the most articulate and accessible legal metaphysicians at
work currently is Professor Steven D. Smith. His book Law's
Quandary poses the question why, if we all acknowledge we are now
legal realists, and the law is the product of social, personal and political
influences, do we, as lawyers and judges, continue to speak of the law as
though it were there to be discovered, d la Langdell or Williston, preexisting but untapped, the work of some unnamed Author? I think it is
clear from Smith's final chapter that he wants to believe there is an
Author-God. 31 His careful dance around the subject was the point of
Justice Scalia's review of the book.32 As I have made clear in previous
writing, I am willing to live with the paradox that it feels like there are
universals to be discovered; nevertheless we will only approach and
never reach understanding of them. Professor Smith recognizes the
frustration in coming to terms with perpetual perplexity. 33 I too am
afraid that the dominance of scientism and pragmatism are a way to
justify the complete abdication of the struggle.
Debating contract law not just in the context of pragmatics of
instrumental reason, but as part of a broader inquiry into and struggle
with the ends to which any endeavor is directed, seems to me one of the
most important things we can do "to help prepare our students for the
world of the professional lawyer." 34 To quote the Ethics of the Fathers in
the Talmud: "You are not required to finish the task but neither are you
at liberty to desist from it."'35 And perhaps, if we expand our theorizing
so as to unpack the normative from the putatively descriptive, permit just
a smidgen of metaphysical inquiry into the ends and means of making
commitments to each other, we might well find an area of high theory in
which even practitioners are interested.
29. 1want to distinguish my criticism of wholly scientific world views, in which we somehow
come to believe that life should approximate the model (in this case, contract law), from what I
think is a far more fruitless endeavor: an attempt to ground the social institution of contract law in
metaphysics. See my article Duty and Consequence: A Non-conflating Theory of Promise and
Contract,36 CUMB. L. REV. 321 (2006). It is not surprising that Williston disdained any "attempt to
derive the principles of contract law from metaphysical philosophy. Such an approach would be a
waste of time-'an excursion into cloud-land."' Movsesian, Williston, supra note 1, at 232-33
(quoting SAMUEL WILLISTON, LIFE AND LAW: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 203 (1940)).
30. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (2004).

31.
32.
33.
34.

See id. at 176-79.
Antonin Scalia, Law & Language,FIRST THINGS, Nov. 2005, at 37, 46 (book review).
See SMITH, supra note 30, at 179.
Movsesian, Formalism,supranote 1, at 144.

35.

PIRKEI AVOT, ETHICS OF THE FATHERS, 2:21.
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